4) “We’ve effectively paralyzed ourselves.” To round things out for now, a reader outside California on the larger political questions the project raises:
I think one thing that stands in HSRs way, not just in California but nationally, is that our system has too many intentional and unintentional choke points, so that we’ve effectively paralyzed ourselves.
Eminent domain proceedings are expensive (as is the land that the project will sit on) and time consuming, and there are enough ways for community organizers of both the positive and negative sort to kill most projects via NIMBYism or on other grounds.
While we’ve pulled off several impressive civil engineering feats recently, we haven’t, as far as I can remember, done anything really new, in the sense of expanding capacity, in perhaps the past twenty years. Most of the major civil engineering projects have been replacements or augmentations of existing (pre-1980) infrastructure, along with some infill development to expand capacity on pre-existing things.
As I say, I think a large part of this is because we have too many kill points built into our system, so that it’s almost impossible to achieve the consensus necessary to build a truly new project. However, there are two other important factors that I think also explain our lack of “new” infrastructure.
First, we already have picked a lot of low hanging fruit. China and the rest of the developing world can absorb a lot of new highways and the like, because they’re building from scratch. We already have a well built highway system, with Interstates that extend to even the most remote areas of the Dakotas and Montana, linking all of our major and most of our minor cities. Our rail system is terrible for passenger traffic, but for freight, it’s second to none in terms of efficiency, thanks in part to our large loading gauges.
Secondly, disruptive infrastructure is more disruptive when it’s disrupting something valuable, and we have a lot of money tied up in existing infrastructure, to the point that it’s prohibitively expensive to reroute things.
Consider the Tappan Zee bridge, which was originally located where it was in order to circumvent the Port Authority’s jurisdiction on trans-Hudson bridges. The replacement bridge, which is scheduled to open in 2018, stands right next to the original, because trying to use the more efficient southern routing was deemed too expensive and disruptive, so they just repeated the mistakes of 50 years ago.
Indeed, this is a large part of why the CA HSR project is supposed to go to the city limits, rather than the city center. Starting to tear up houses and apartments at $1M and $2M a pop gets very expensive very quickly, especially when you have people who are fighting it in court…
Finally, I think there is some justified skepticism about how the government, especially at the state and federal level, contracts and supervises these projects, especially in terms of cost control, though this problem isn’t unique to those levels of government, or to civil infrastructure projects in general… Perhaps the new overachievers in local government that you referenced in one of your prior posts will be able to make headway on this.
Nonetheless, I do think you’re right that large infrastructure projects are often criticized more harshly than perhaps they should have been, particularly in terms of their societal merit, since most infrastructure projects don’t capture the full value of the benefits that they create (nor should they).
For the record: This post is No. 6 in a series. See also No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, and No. 5. Also see the interactive map showing different planned construction phases of the project, put together by UC Davis, the HSRA, and the mapping team at Esri.